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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, WESTERN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN BASE STUDY

Subj: Study Plan for the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean Base Study,
approval of (U)

Ref: (a) Study Plan for Western Pacific and Indian Ocean Base Study
submitted 7 October 1967
(b) Study Directive for Western Pacific and Indian Ocean Base
Study

1. (S) Reference (a) has been reviewed. The Plan is considered to provide an excellent vehicle for the conduct of a study of the highest importance to future naval operations in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.
2. (U) By this memorandum, reference (a) is approved. You will forward copies in accordance with paragraph 8 of reference (b).

W. F. A. Wendt

W. F. A. WENDT
Vice Admiral, USN
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Plans and Policy)

NAVY DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

Group 3
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STUDY PLANI. General

The primary object of this study is to determine the Navy requirements in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters for bases in the 1970-1980 period. The study must develop preliminary findings for those objectives laid down by the Study Directive which will contribute to the Navy input to the other studies commencing about 1 January 1968. Implicit in such a requirement is the task of providing a valid rationale and analysis which is acceptable to Navy, OSD and State. The recommended base structure must not only be operationally required, but also justifiable and reasonably attainable. These requirements suggest a natural division of the effort into operational, political, and logistics groupings. The study outline which follows is considered to be the sequence of tasks which, when accomplished, will logically lead to the desired objective.

II. Specific Guidance

A. The study will consider all agreed threats and any other potential threats considered appropriate by the director. It will also consider all appropriate political developments, deployment requirements, and base retention/utilization/acquisition potentials through 1980. Emphasis will be directed to ascertaining needs for action now to assure real estate which may not be available when needed in the future. Potential post-1980 advantages, where discernible, will be given consideration in the development of alternate base facility structures.

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B. Forces. JSOP 69-76 forces for 1976 will be basic but not limiting. Deployments can be postulated, which cannot physically be accomplished by any reasonable allocation of those forces to the study area, if there is strong justification, but they must be so identified.

C. Logistic Support Concepts.

1. Part B of the enclosure to VCNO memo ser 0047P93 of 7 August 1967 provides basic guidance.
2. Pending results of the UNREP Concepts Study (not yet begun), existing resupply concepts will be followed, as modified by:

(a) Capabilities of UNREP ships now programmed.

(b) NARDELOG Study findings favoring increased use of air resupply and VERTREP.

D. Deployment Requirements.

1. Part A and Tab A of the enclosure to VCNO memo ser 0047P93 of 7 August 1967 provide guidance.

2. For initial development of deployment and support requirements, subject to later review in the light of political analysis, it will be assumed that for the study period the U. S. requires certain basic capabilities in the study area which are not dependent on political permission:

(a) To keep major striking, assault, strategic deterrent, and sea control forces economically deployed on a sustained basis, and at high readiness, in the Western Pacific.

(b) To keep minor forces economically deployed and effective

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on a sustained basis in the Indian Ocean.

(c) To institute sea surveillance promptly at any point on major sea lanes.

(d) To transit ships expeditiously, at will, in and between oceans.

(e) To conduct intelligence operations.

(f) To communicate reliably with forces afloat.

E. Support Facilities. The study will consider the full spectrum of practicable support postures, including maximal reliance on mobile support from bases in the United States and its island possessions. Solely for the purpose of indicating the range of facilities to be considered in initial development of alternate support combinations, prior to completion of political analysis, and without any implication that any single facility or class of facilities is an indicated solution, the following listing is provided. All combinations selected for initial analysis are subject to review based on analysis of political factors and cost effectiveness trade-offs.

1. Existing and planned U. S. facilities, including Diego Garcia and Aldabra.

2. Facilities or real estate in friendly nations, not normally maintained as U. S. bases, which might be politically available for the use desired.

(a) Existing military or commercial facilities which can be used without development.

(b) Facilities or real estate which can be made useable

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in time to meet the need by development initiated after the start of the contingency or war mobilization.

3. New facilities, assumed to be available for unrestricted use, as set forth in Tab A of Op-090 memo ser 0048P93 of 12 August 1967, covering alternate WESTPAC sites, plus:

(a) Other islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory (Chagos, Farquhar, Desroches). (Anchorage, VP/VR/COD, POL, Communications).

(b) Cocos Island (VP/VR/COD, limited POL, communications).

(c) A site in the Nicobar Islands (VP/VR/COD, POL, communications).

(d) A site in the Socotra group or at Masira, off South Arabia (VP/VR/COD, communications).

(e) A reef and adjacent banks in the Northwest sector of the Dangerous Ground area of the South China Sea (VP/VR/COD, anchorage, POL, ammo).

(f) Additional locations as determined to offer operational advantage and apparent feasibility, subject to political validation.

III. Study Outline

A. Assumptions. Analysis will employ as basic assumptions the conditions contained within the three scenarios of reference D of the Study Directive. These will be subject to refinement/revision as the political sub-studies advance.

B. Operations.

1. Define the notional units of the 1970's taking into account new development. Utilize existing definitions to the maximum extent practicable.

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(a) Define typical activity rates for these tactical units.

2. Specify operational response in 1970-80 period to approved general war and contingency plans, in terms of numbers and types of standard tactical units, intensity and duration of operations.

3. Specify operational response in 1970-80 period to contingencies forecast by political group but not included in present plans.

4. Develop logistic demand sheets.

5. Select operationally useable new sites from those politically feasible to acquire.

6. Compare operational site requirements against those politically feasible to acquire.

C. Political.

1. Review and update scenarios A, B, & C, (Ref (d) Study Directive) utilizing JSOP, JIEP, etc. Development of additional scenarios may be pursued if considered necessary.

(a) Predict possible base loss and/or limitations on base access and use.

2. Study group, in cooperation with outside political consultant, assess:

(a) Level, nature, and disposition of threat in 1970-80 period to U. S. interests, neighboring nations, and other related nations.

(b) Capability of enemy forces generating the threat.

(c) Neighbor nations evaluation of threat to their security.

3. Possible contingencies not foreseen in current analyses.

4. Define a politically - feasible program of new base acquisition

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For analysis by operations and logistics group.

D. Logistics

1. Develop support factors, for bases and notional units.

(a) From activity rates provided by IIIB(a) above and logistic demand base sheets provided by IIIB4 above, develop support.

2. Develop capacity and costs for existing bases.

3. Identify mobile support which can be interchanged with base facilities.

4. Develop costs for mobile support and transport elements.

E. Analysis

1. With information provided from 1, 2, and 3, above, conduct computer analysis for optimum combination of fixed and mobile support for 1970-80 period.

F. Evaluation

1. Evaluate computer analysis, comparing preferred locations with existing U.S., or available to U.S., operating bases.

G. Report

1. Submit preliminary report on 1 December 1967, presenting tentative findings on:

(a) Optimum base structure to cope with study situations (scenarios A, B, and C).

(b) Optimum base structure to be developed.

(c) The applicable specific objectives enumerated in paragraph 5 of the Study Directive.

H. Detailed sub-study guidance is appended at Tabs A and B.

1. Operational Studies,

- (a) Identification of natural sub-areas of operation.
- (b) Identification of standard tactical units.
- (c) Projection of the wide variety of naval deployments and operations which may be required for the spectrum of operations from peacetime to major war operations. These must be determined for each sector and type of deployment or operations posing significantly different support problems.
- (d) Projection of activity rates and of types of support required for effectiveness in each deployment, as a base for logistic studies.

2. Logistic Studies.

- (a) Develop models and data bank to determine support requirements of every type, in each sector, for each deployment specified.
- (b) Development of alternate means of satisfying these support requirements, using varying combinations of mobile support, existing U. S. shore facilities, non-U. S. sites probably available in specified contingencies, and new U. S. facilities to be developed at sites of assured availability.
- (c) Trade-off comparisons among the alternatives. This is complicated by the probability that, while for some support areas the differences will be reducible to cost terms, in others the differences may be measurable only in effectiveness (i.e., a given facility site, or a mobile support approach, will be either go or no-go with respect to a given deployment). While it may ultimately be possible to reduce

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most logistic factors to cost/effectiveness terms, an early solution is not assured. Since it appears impractical to reduce the political factors to similar terms in any event, conclusions based solely on minimal cost in dollars for a given level of effectiveness appear infeasible. Judgment factors will be an inevitable component of the results.

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Expansion of Tasks For Operations and Logistics Study

1. Deployments Sub-Study

a. Identify limits of operational sub-areas to be used, considering primarily operational and logistic factors but also U. S. interests and other political factors.

b. Set forth types of basic situations for which deployment requirements are to be developed. These will include peacetime, local contingencies, and major war, and will include sufficient variations thereof (e.g., war at sea) to develop the full range of deployments and logistic support potentially required.

c. Identify for each basic situation a family of typical standard tactical units (e.g., CVA task group) for use as a base in calculating logistic demand. Indicate composition in terms of typical ship and aircraft types and Marine elements programmed for 1976 forces.

d. For each standard tactical unit and for typical support ships of each type, in each basic situation, develop typical activity rates appropriate thereto:

(1) Percent of time underway, average speed underway based on typical operating profile.

(2) Aircraft sorties activity.

(3) Strike activity.

(4) Landing force activity.

e. Identify the types and missions of deployments and/or combat operations to be considered for each situation.

f. For each sub-area, develop a matrix showing for each situ-

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ation the prospects that each type/mission of deployment may be required in the period through 1980, and indicate qualitatively the broad combatant types (Navy and Marine Corps) required in each case. Initial determinations will exploit all opportunities and potentials for application of Navy and Marine forces to support U. S. interests and objectives; will be based on part A and Tab A of the enclosure to VCNO Memo Ser 0047P93 of 7 August 1967, and on judgment supplemented by consultation with political study personnel; will deliberately emphasize inclusiveness; and will be tentative pending later review in the light of factors developed in the political study.

g. For each element in these matrices for which deployment is indicated, prepare a logistic demand base sheet indicating:

(1) Typical combatant deployment levels by type, using typical standard tactical units as applicable, based on judgment supplemented by inspection of war plans where available and relevant. (See paragraph II.D., Specific Guidance.) Make provision for forces to carry out Navy tasks which may result from Army/Air Force support requirements.

(2) Requirements for each type of support needed, in quantitative terms so far as appropriate.

(3) Potential alternate sources of each type of support: mobile, existing facilities, friendly facilities, new U. S. facilities, and combinations thereof as appropriate.

(4) Number/size and cost where feasible, and go/no-go indication in any case, for each alternate source, for each type of support.

h. To have available on 10 November initial political inputs sufficient for preliminary review of initial projections with respect to:

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(1) Requirements for each deployment in terms of U. S. interests.

(2) Political availability of each existing U. S. facility and of other facilities/sites on non-U. S. soil, with respect to each deployment/situation/basic threat level,

(3) Political feasibility of each new U. S. high-assurance site considered.

1. To permit extensive coverage in a short time, and to avoid seeking a degree of precision inconsistent with the inherently imprecise political projections for 12 years in the future, the logistic analysis will seek only ball-park accuracy, and:

(1) Will avoid time-phased scenarios, assignment of individual ships by hull number or class, and detailed scheduling of demand and UNREP.

(2) Will be based on:

(a) Most probable locus of logistic demand point within the sub-area, if applicable, otherwise describe the area of demand.

(b) For VP or other fixed-base reconnaissance aircraft, and for communications and similar types of support, the limits of the area to be covered,

(c) Activity rates applicable, and any significant variations expected.

2. Logistics Sub-Study (Resupply and Repair)

a. For each standard tactical unit and other deployable ship type and for each situation/activity rate, as developed by deployments sub-study, develop logistic demand factors applicable thereto:

(1) Average daily demand over an appropriate period for each class of consumables, spares, and repair parts, fleet freight, mail, replacement of aircraft, and evacuation of dud aircraft for repair. Items

which are functions of personnel on board applicable to all types of units, will be computed only per man day and not for each tactical unit separately.

(2) Ship upkeep/repair factors affecting requirements for tenders, repair ships, or shore facilities.

b. For each situation/activity rate develop manning levels for all combatants and mobile support units, and factors for average daily personnel transport support, to cover normal rotation, replacement of attrition, augmentation, technical specialists, command liaison, personal emergency, and medical evacuation.

c. For each type of basic situation develop factors as to percentage of each type of consumables, etc., and of personnel, requiring air vice sea transport to the sub-area (and to the user unit when feasible).

d. For each type of basic situation and for each type of UNREP ship and transport aircraft, develop cycling factors for determination of units required as a function of average daily demand rate, distance from supply or transfer point, and required frequency of delivery. This is to be based on notional ships and aircraft, typical of programmed or projected 1976 forces, and on cycling appropriate to the operational and threat situation. Maximal practicable use is to be made of consolidation at sea and of VERTREP. Radical departures from present resupply concepts are not to be assumed in the initial phase of this study but may be introduced in later phases.

e. Develop factors for upkeep/repair capability of existing WESTPAC shore facilities, of tenders and repair ships programmed for 1976, and of other types of afloat repair facilities which are or could practicably be provided for this era,

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f. Develop system cost factors for mobile logistic support elements and for point-to-point transport as required.

g. Develop rough planning factors for approximate magnitude of forward storage and transfer capacity required for consumables as function of demand rates and other relevant factors.

3. Specialized Logistics Sub-Studies

a. Communications and SIGINT

(1) Assemble data on area of coverage, reliability and capacity of existing facilities potentially subject to political erosion.

(2) Determine potential applicability of alternate sites (present U. S. territory or from Facilities Sub-Study task in paragraph 4a.(1)) and of satellite systems achievable by 1970-80, to substitute for capabilities which might be lost per paragraph 3.a.(1) above.

(3) Develop cost and effectiveness of facilities: (a) afloat, (b) transportable to above sites, and (c) Permanent on above sites, as applicable to such substitutions. Define minimal real estate requirements, in general terms, with close attention to future dispersal requirements to minimize radiation effects on other facilities.

(4) As deployment requirements for sub-areas are developed, study each to determine adequacy of present facilities (including mobile), augmented by prospective satellite capabilities, to support the deployment. Develop and study cost/effectiveness of alternatives to meet deficiencies, and define minimal real estate requirements to meet continuing contingent needs (including real estate for transportable facilities).

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b. Towing and Salvage

(1) As deployment requirements for sub-areas are developed, determine towage/salvage support requirements for each (including support of fleet training); determine alternatives available, including reliance on friendly or commercial sources, or on fleet resources from another sub-area, and indicate minimum deployed fleet units required in this or other sub-areas.

c. Navigation Aids

(1) Assemble data on present and planned navigation aids (LORAN C, OMEGA, etc.) which present potential problems of political erosion.

(2) Determine potential applicability of alternate sites.

(3) Develop alternatives; define minimal real estate requirements in general terms, as for paragraph a.(3) above.

(4) As deployment requirements for each sub-area are developed, study each to determine adequacy of present planned facilities, augmented by satellites, and other systems not dependent on forward sites. Develop and study cost effectiveness of alternatives to meet deficiencies, and define minimal real estate requirements.

d. Training and Target Facilities (Air, Gunnery, ASW, and Missile)

(1) Assemble data on present training and target facilities which present potential problems of political erosion.

(2) Determine potential applicability of alternate sites.

(3) Develop alternatives; define minimal real estate requirements..

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(4) As requirements for sustained deployments are developed, study each to determine adequacy of present facilities or sites to support the deployment in 1975-80. Develop and study cost effectiveness of alternatives to meet deficiencies, and define minimal real estate/air space requirements.

e. Search and Rescue

(1) As deployment requirements are developed, review each to determine search and rescue support requirements which pose potential shore facility requirements. Review the adequacy of present facilities to meet these requirements. For any deployment situations in which the availability of such facilities may become questionable, study the applicability of alternative sites. Define any special facility development required at such sites additional to that which may be required for other uses of such sites.

f. Medical and Dental Support

(1) For present facilities potentially subject to political erosion, develop alternates meeting the basic requirements.

(2) As deployment requirements for sub-areas are developed, study each to determine adequacy of present facilities to support the deployment, so far as not met by integral ship-medical facilities and medical evacuation to rear areas. Develop and study cost effectiveness of alternatives to meet deficiencies, to include afloat and shore facilities. Requirements in remote sectors for medical/dental care supplementary to deployed ship capability yet not warranting evacuation, are of interest.

g. Undersea Surveillance

(1) Estimate future potentials for cost effective application of fixed underwater surveillance systems at new locations in the area, for objectives to include: surveillance and warning of SSRN movements,

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support of offensive ASW forces, protection of shipping lanes and task force operating areas, protection of deployed strategic offensive of defensive forces.

(2) For each such application select alternate shore sites employable and estimate cost effectiveness differentials as between sites.

h. Rest and Recreation. As deployment requirements for sub-areas are developed, and in consultation with political study group determine for each the probability that provision must be made for R & R sites under U. S. control to supplement ports of call and U. S. facilities on foreign soil. Where such requirements may exist determine applicability of sites as per a.(2), and relative essentiality of the requirement.

i. Aircraft Repair. Develop and compare cost effectiveness, with respect to a moderate number and variety of situations in which repair facilities in Japan cannot be relied on (consult political study group), of alternative solutions, to include afloat facilities, a forward base on U. S. soil, and transportation to CONUS or Hawaii.

j. Specialized Support Requirements of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces. Develop any potential requirements for forward facilities peculiar to those forces, and develop cost effectiveness of alternate locations having acceptable assurance of availability.

k. Specialized Support Requirements of SSN Forces. Develop any potential requirements for forward facilities peculiar to these forces, and develop relative cost effectiveness of alternate locations having acceptable assurance of availability.

l. U. S. Marine Corps Forces.

(1) Identify the requirements for forward base facilities for Marine Corps forces, develop related MILCON costs of alternate locations

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having acceptable assurance of availability.

(2) Determine training area requirements and insure alternate locations have adequate area contiguous to same.

(3) Develop potential requirements for maintenance facilities for Marine Corps items of equipment considering availability/non-availability of similar U. S. Army facilities.

(4) Develop storage requirements for Marine Corps pre-positioned war reserve stocks considering availability/non-availability of U. S. Army support.

(5) Develop port facility requirements in support of alternate Marine Corps bases.

(6) Develop time-delay factors for alternate locations, in relation to the deployment requirements developed.

4. Facilities Sub-Study

a. By quick survey of available data, tentatively determine the prospective physical feasibility of using each potential new site (Specific Guidance, paragraph ITA For each of the basic types of support potentially required in its area, and its rough potential capacity where relevant:

(1) Major base complexes: anchorages, airfields, troop basing/staging, major supply, storage and industrial facilities, training and targets, and communications.

(2) Outpost facilities: Anchorage, airstrip, POL/ammo storage, training and targets, and communications.

b. Conduct Internal Liaison to explore possible interests of Army/USAF in sites as in a. above and in other new sites, in order to

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develop potentials for co-location or for competition for limited real estate.

c. Estimate roughly the basic development costs (anchorage, logistic airstrip) for each and assemble data and develop factors for rapid computation of incremental costs to develop/construct other new facilities at these sites.

5. Combination and Analysis of Sub-Study Data

a. Develop for each deployment a matrix of alternate combinations of mobile and fixed support.

b. Review and modify these matrices in the light of political study findings as to elements of U. S. power required, and availability of existing and new facilities.

c. Apply cost factors to develop the overall support costs for each combination.

d. Conduct cost effectiveness tradeoff analyses of the alternate support combinations as modified.

e. Based on these analyses determine preferred and alternate support postures and base structures for each major area.

f. Estimate the effect on the force missions of the selection of primary and alternate structures.

g. Estimate the variances of costs as affected by the selection of primary and alternate structures.

h. Determine specific capabilities which would be attained by the provision of the primary and alternate situations, including such specifics as effects on sortie capabilities, response time, percent

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of time on station, survivability, and capabilities for flexible response to deployment requirements or base denial situations less favorable than estimated.

1. Review and either validate or recommend modification of the overseas support facility policy and objectives promulgated in references (a) and (b) of the study directive.

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EXPANSION OF TASKS FOR POLITICAL SUB-STUDY

A. Broad Tasks.

1. Assessment of U. S. interests, priorities and objectives in the area under consideration during the period 1970-1980.
2. Comparison of U. S. interests and objectives with those of other nations in the area and the USSR and CPR in order to predict a spectrum of possible relationships affecting U. S. interests.
3. Development of specific threats to U. S. interests as well as projection of a range of basic threat levels in several representative situations based on the degree of aggressiveness of the USSR and/or CPR:
4. Derivation for each representative situation of the roles for sea power in complementing the other elements and instruments of U. S. power in support of U. S. interests.
5. In coordination with the logistics sub-study, development of the preferred and alternative base structures having the minimum political constraints on their use over the expected range of threats and situations. Definition of those constraints applicable to the use of bases selected as primary or alternate.
6. Recommendation of a program of policy initiatives to develop the recommended base structure.

B. Detailed Expansion of Tasks.

1. Make a political appraisal of the Afro-Asian World of the 1980's based on the political, social, economic, and military factors which are likely to exist during the period 1970-1980. Identify the factors as permanent, transitory, or of undetermined nature. Recent appraisals of these factors as found in documents such as the JLRSS, JSOP,

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National Policy Papers, SSDSG studies, etc. may be used to the extent that they remain valid for the period under consideration. Validate insofar as possible the following assumptions on which to base the appraisal.

a. Assumptions

- (1) No strategic employment of nuclear weapons.
- (2) Possible limited employment of tactical nuclear weapons.
- (3) Stabilized situation in Vietnam, negotiated or non-negotiated, on terms satisfactory to US interests.
- (4) "Wars of national liberation" continue in the Afro-Asian world.
- (5) No major UK interest in the theater; minor financial and political ties remain in Hong Kong.
- (6) Possible proliferation of nuclear weapons.
- (7) Possible Pak/ChiCom alliance against India.
- (8) An indigenous power vacuum in the region despite possible balance of power arrangements such as India - Indonesia - Japan.

b. Examine the political, social, economic, and military factors as well as the elements and instruments of power within each country to the extent that they will affect the internal stability of the country as well as the determination of its national interests, priorities, and objectives. What are the likely effects, as applicable, within each country of the following

trends or

trends or situations?

- (1) Population Pressures.
- (2) Economic Progress or Lack of Progress.
- (3) Progress Toward Nation-Building.
- (4) Ideological Pressures and Political Orientation.
- (5) Military Developments.
- (6) Technological Developments.
- (7) Elements of Power.
- (8) Resources.

2. Predict the spectrum of possible relationships among the major Afro-Asian powers based on the foregoing political appraisal and the identifiable national interests priorities and objectives of each, considering:

- (a) The US as a world power
- (b) Hostile powers
- (c) Competitive powers
- (d) Allied powers
- (e) Associated powers
- (f) Minor powers
- (g) The above examination of national interests by country or sub-area should include consideration of the following:

(1) The national interests, priorities, and objectives from an indigenous viewpoint insofar as possible.

(2) The political, social, economic, and military factors as well as the elements and instruments of power affecting a determination

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of the national interests, priorities, and objectives of each.

(3) The competition between US/USSR/CPR interests and the interests and objectives of each vis-a-vis the other two in maintaining presence and influence in each of the major sub-areas and in applying restraints and deterrents to the exercise or accretion of power and influence by the other two.

(4) The interests and objectives of each in utilizing this area for contributing to general deterrence, defense, or retaliation against strategic nuclear capabilities of the other two to threaten its homeland.

(5) The major factors which will affect the relationships which will exist between the US, USSR, and CPR during the period 1970-1980. In this respect consider the impact of the:

- (a) Outcome of the Vietnam war.
- (b) Outcome of present CPR internal disorders.
- (c) Advance of technology.
- (d) USSR-CPR border and ideological problems
- (e) Project the primary interests and objectives of the US, USSR, and CPR in each country in the area based on the expected trends.
- (f) Compare the primary interests and objectives of each country in the area with the interests and objectives of its neighbors as well as the US, USSR, and CPR noting areas of mutual and divergent interests.

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(6) What kind of world should the US seek in Asia.

3. Estimate the range and variety of potentially serious threats to US interests and objectives in each sub-area as well as to the US position as the dominant power in Asia which may require US deployments or operations.

a. Determine specific threats to US interests and objectives likely to develop in terms of the expected aggressiveness of the USSR and CPR external postures and programs, both overt and covert, the success of these programs, expected USSR and CPR capabilities and the relationships predicted in steps C1 and C2.

b. Attempt to assess the prospects of the development of these specific threats.

c. Assess the prospects that various ranges of threat levels in the study area will occur.

4. Based on the foregoing analysis describe several representative situations which might exist in the area during the period 1970-1980.

a. Examine the three previously constructed scenarios provided by OP-61 Memo Ser 00881P61 of 29 August 1967.

b. Validate these three or construct new "representative situations" of an appropriate number to fairly describe the range of threats and relationships by sub-area as determined in steps C1, C2, and C3.

c. Indicate for each "representative situation" the degree of threat to:

(1) Each nation of the area and group by sub-area

(2) Sea commerce in each sub-area of the Western

Pacific and Indian Oceans.

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(3) US influence and credibility in general in each major sub-area under consideration.

(4) US nuclear deterrent/retaliatory posture and the safety of the United States.

d. For each "representative situation" determine:

(1) The availability of POL from the Persian Gulf.

(2) The availability of the Suez Canal.

(3) The prospect of political attempts to restrict US use of international straits and lesser seas.

5. Determine the elements of power which the US will require to support its national objectives within the range of the "representative situations" selected.

a. Examine the elements of power expected to be available to the US during the period 1970-1980 i.e. political, psychological, economic, financial, and military.

b. Determine which elements of power can and will most likely be brought to bear in the area under consideration based on the likely threats, the willingness of the US to commit its national substance to achieve its goals, and the predicted international relationships portrayed in the "representative situations" constructed in step C.4.

c. Derive the requirements for military forces as the principal element of power which will be needed to combat major threats.

d. State the requirement for sea power both for the direct application of naval and marine forces as well as for the support of Army and Air Forces in the furtherance of US interests and objectives in the area.

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Consider the domestic and international political factors which might influence the degree of reliance on sea based vs. land base forces.

e. Consider the need for sea surveillance and control not necessarily related to any individual nation or contingency in each sub-area.

(NOTE: Items c, d, and e will require the assistance of other sub-groups.)

6. Determine the domestic and international political considerations which would constrain or facilitate the use of military forces and the establishment of bases in the area within the context of the "representative situations".

a. Construct a matrix which will indicate the constraints on specific types of US use of facilities in particular countries in support of specific contingency situations.

b. For each range of threats and situations portrayed by the "representative situations" determine the degree of assurance that each nation of the area would permit use of facilities on their soil to support the varied range of US deployments and operations that may be required.

c. Estimate the willingness of each state to accept US troops, air, and naval bases on its soil during:

- (1) Peacetime or cold war deployments.
- (2) War or contingency involving the host country.
- (3) War or contingency not involving the host country

and specifically under each condition to permit the following types of use:

(a) Repair, upkeep, staging, and R&R for nuclear powered ships or those with nuclear weapons/components aboard.

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(b) Repair, upkeep, staging, and R&R for other combatant ships.

(c) Home porting of US ships.

(d) Basing of aircraft for strikes against host countries.

(e) Basing of aircraft for training, patrol, ASW or reconnaissance.

(f) Training and logistics for troops.

(g) Storage of nuclear weapons.

(h) USN/USMC logistic activities.

(i) Basing or repair of special categories of ships such as tenders, mine warfare craft, riverine craft which require substantial logistic facilities in support of their operations.

(j) Staging of logistic aircraft (including civil airfields).

(k) Fueling of combatants (including commercial facilities).

7. Determine the probable availability or non-availability of proposed primary and alternate base sites including the prospects for retaining presently established bases.

a. Given the desired primary and alternate base structures: (NOTE: The desired primary and alternate base structures should be determined as a joint effort of the logistic and political sub-groups. CNA (INS) study "Naval Tasks and Options in the Far East and Southeast Asia-1980" should be examined during this effort.)

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(1) Determine the probable degree of availability for each existing US facility and of the other desired facilities/sites with respect to each deployment/situation/basic threat level.

b. Determine the practicability of obtaining US sovereignty or unrestricted use agreement for each primary or alternate site.

c. Estimate the effect of the establishment of the proposed primary or alternate base postures on the anticipated political relationships in the area.

8. Determine policy initiatives required to create the international political environment which will facilitate development of the recommended naval base structure.

a. Given the recommended base structure:

(1) Describe the best attainable international political environment.

(2) Determine a sequence of US actions consonant with expected overall US policies which will optimize the attainment of this environment.

(3) Determine desirable USN/DOD policies and actions which would support US policy in attaining the desired international political environment.

b. Recommend political actions necessary to secure appropriate real estate on a timely basis and with the desired degree of assurance that it will be available for the range of expected employment. Examine the proposed action program for Western Pacific Facility Sites (Encl. (1) to OP-090 memo ser 0048P93 of 12 August 1967) and validate those actions deemed appropriate.

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